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DOUGLAS LEE CURTIS, 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
HARMON ELECTRONICS, INC. , 
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
\'/ESTERN RAILROAD, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 15018 
This is an action in tort brought for injuries sustained as 
a result of a collision between a pickup truck in which Appellant 
was a passenger and an engine of The Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad. 
Appellant appeals from a nonsuit granted by Third Judicial 
~strict Court Judge Jay E. Banks, upon conclusion of the evidence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A judgment of nonsuit was entered in favor of Respondents 
and against Appellant. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant Curtis seeks a reversal and remand to 
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the Third Judicial District Court, and submission of the factuc: 
issues in dispute to a jury. 
In this brief the abbreviation "Tr" refers to the page 
number of the Reporter's transcript of trial proceedings. "R" 
refers to the page number of the material in the file from the 
District Court. "Dp" refers to the page number in a deposition. 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 21, 1973 Plaintiff was riding as a passenger i:. 
a vehicle being driven in an easterly direction on 9000 South 3t: 
which collided with a southbound train owned and operated by 
defendant, Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad (R. 2 & 3). 
The testimony of Michael Peterson whose house is t~ 
to the railroad tracks (Tr. 3, L. 26; Exhibits 9 and 10), and '.i~.: 
at the time of the accident was in his back yard 
(Tr. 5, L. 27), indicates that he heard the train approach but 
not recall hearing a whistle (Tr. 7, L.4). 
Mrs. Nelson, who was a passenger in an automobile th~ I 
passed over the tracks from east to west just prior to the colL 
(Tr. 23, L. 5), testified that she did not hear any audible signe. 
from the train while her vehicle was approaching the tracks (tr. 
L. 4). She testified that she heard the whistle sound fort~ 
first time when her vehicle was upon the tracks, stating, "I can 
recall he [the train] looked like he was right in the window; 1 
mean, you know, it [the whistle] startled us." 25 Ls. H (Tr. , 
She testified that when the train did sound its whistle, the trl'l 
) from th' I was only three telephone poles (less than 300 feet awaY 
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intersection (Tr. 25, L. 27). 
Mrs. Wagstaff, who was driving the vehicle in which Mrs. 
Helson was riding, testified to essentially the same facts as 
1 
!Irs. Nelson. When asked the question, "Do you recall hearing any 
1 
.,1histle from the train or horn from the train. . . before your car 
entered the crossing?" she replied unequivocally, "No," (Tr. 33, 
Ls 6-15). When asked regarding the first time she heard any 
•,;histle from the train, she replied, "We were on the tracks when 
he blew the whistle," (Tr. 33, L. 18). Also, when queried about 
~e distance of the train when the whistle was blown for the first 
time, she responded, "It was like the back yard past the Peterson 
house. He was close," (Tr. 33, Ls. 25-26). 
Allen John Karras, whose deposition was admitted into evi-
dence and stipulated to constitute a part of the record on appeal, 
es working on a pickup truck in front of his gas station at the 
t~e the accident occurred. His gas station is next to the railroad 
tracks, situated on the southeast corner (Dp. 4, Ls. 7, ll, 16). 
His attention was drawn to the train by its whistle, causing him 
to look up (Dp. 20, Ls. l-3), the sound of the engine (Dp. 6, L. 19), 
and the dinging of the bells (Dp. 7, L. 6). His best estimate of 
t~ time lapse between his first hearing of the train whistle and 
the collision is only 5 seconds (Dp. 19, L. 20). The train's 
Whistle was therefore only being sounded a period of four ( 4) 
seconds before the front of the train's first power unit entered 
the intersection, since the train was traveling at 50 miles per 
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hour or 74 feet per second (Tr. 45, Ls. 22-28 and Tr. 51, L.::l 
for the reason that the collision occurred 72 feet bac'K from :•, 1 
front of the first power unit (Tr. 46, Ls. 10-ll). The whistl: I 
therefore sounded for a distance of only 296 feet ( 4 seconds x -~ 
feet per second) prior to the train's entering upon the crossbl 
The testimony of David Lord, accident reconstruction 11.\ 
pert, was that the train whistle would have to be blowing com;:.
1 
I 
uously for eighteen (18) seconds in order for the sounding of~~ 
whistle to meet the statutory requirement of one-quarter mile,. 
the admitted speed of 50 miles per hour. 
From the above testimony of Mrs. Nelson, Mrs. Wagstar:: 
Mr. Karras, it must be concluded that all heard the train's · .. ~:~:·· 
for the first time when it was substantially in the same ~st~ 
less than 300 feet from the crossing. All were in excellent 
positions to have heard the whistle sooner had it been sou~~ 
sooner. 
Mr. Pope, the train's engineer at the time of thecolli: 
testified that he had been through the intersection in quest~u. 
hundreds of times (Tr. 57, L. 30). When asked if he had sounae: 
the whistle on each of those occasions, he said, "Every time," 
(Tr. 52, L. 19). When asked if he had sounded the whistle for· 
statutory distance prior to the subject collision, he replied, 
"Yes, sir," (Tr. 52, 1.22). When asked the question, "What ~e' 
would there be for you to remember specifically sounding t~ ~ 
on the approach to this crossing as opposed to any of the doze~ 
or hundreds of others," which he crosses every day, he responc: 
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"Because I blow the whistle for every crossing," (Tr. 61, Ls. 16-
l?). r~r. Pope had no particular recollection of sounding the 
•11histle for the full quarter mile on this occasion, but either 
~~ught he had because he always did, or tried to, (Tr. 61, Ls. 
2o-29; Tr. 63, Ls. 1-8). 
The strongest testimony produced by defendant on the 
question of sounding of the whistle for the statutory distance was 
th~ of Trooper Richard Mattingly. He was outside his patrol car, 
ju~ having finished issuing a citation to a motorist on I-15 
four-tenths of a mile ( 2112 feet) north of the accident crossing 
(Tr. 4-A, L. 15). His attention was drawn to defendant's south-
bound train by its whistle as it passed his location (Tr. 4-A, 
L. 27). He then got into his patrol car and traveled south to 
9~h South, where he exited. He made no observation concerning 
sounding of a whistle within the statutory one-quarter mile ( 1310 
rJf 
feet)~ the crossing. 
There is no direct evidence that the whistle was sounded 
fur the statutory distance except the equivocal and self-serving 
testimony of the engineer, Mr. Pope. His recollection was of 
habit, and conflicts with the testimony of at least four disinter-
ested witnesses, all of whom place the first sounding of the 
J 'llhistle at less than 300 fee:
0
:::m I the crossing. 
I 
I 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER ON THE ISSUE WHETHER DEFENDANT'S 
~GINEER SOUNDED THE WHISTLE CONTINUOUSLY FOR ONE QUARTER MILE 
~ORE ENTERING THE CROSSING AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE. A NON-
§l!IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. 
The subject statute provides: 
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"Every locomotive shall be provided 'Hit h a bell ..... . 
shall be rurg continuously from a point not less th "d• .. 
· ht d f · .an elg y ro s ro~ any Clty or to~n street or public hi;· 
way grade crosslng until such c2ty or town street 0 ~ public highway grade crossing shall be crossed, bu/ 
except in towns and at terminal points, the soundin~ ,, 
the locomotive whistle or siren at least one-fourth~~ 
a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall '··I 
deemed equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid; 0,;:. 1 t~e prevalence of fogs, snow and dust storms, the lcw:.l 
tlve whistle shall be sounded before each street cr0 ,,:·1 
while passing through cities and towns." o~. 
U.C.A. Section 56-l-14. 
In Smith vs Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 33 P. 626, 9 :jc;i' 
141 (1893), the Supreme Court of Utah was confronted with as!'. 
I 
tion similar to that in the instant case. The only question p:'·i 
I 
sented was whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the ( 
verdict of the jury. The Court's opinion includes the followi[:l 
"The plaintiff testifies that he looked and listene~ 
for the train; that no whistle was sounded, and no bell 1 
was rung, in approaching the crossing. Watters, who 
accompanied the plaintiff, swears to substantially t~ 
same thing. A brother of the plaintiff, who was ridb; 
on horseback some 150 yards in the rear of the wagon,,: 1 
testifies that no signal of the approach of the train 'i"l 
given. Against this testimony the defendant offer:d~ \ 
testimony of the railway conductor, of the locomot~n. 1 
engineer, and of the locomotive fireman on the trau -=:, ... 
question, to the effect that the whistle was s?unded b.?, 
reaching the crossing. All of them swear positlvely th~:._, 
this was done. The locomotive engineer and fireman teo•: 
1
' 
fied that it was sounded about 200 yards distant from t::, 
crossing. Neither of them claimed that the bell was ru;: 
The failure to sound the whistle or ring the bell • 0U;:: 
any warning of approach, is the negligence relied u~t 
the olaintiff." 
fl l ,, I The Court noted that the evidence was in direct con ··' I 
with three witnesses on each side, and held that under those ci:· 
I 
· bY cumstances the case became peculiarly one for determination 
jury. 
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The similarity of the two cases is clear. In Smith the 
Dlaintiff 1vas contending: but for the railroad's failure to sound 
the whistle, there would have been no accident. In the case now 
before the Court, plaintiff contends that if the whistle had been 
sounded continuously, beginning at the statutory threshold of one-
quarter mile, plaintiff's driver would have been made aware of 
the train and able to stop. A form of strict liability is imposed 
by statute in case of a railroad's failure to comply. The subject 
statute is as follows: 
"Every person in charge of a locomotive violating 
the provisions of this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor and the railroad company shall be liable for all 
damages which any person may sustain by reason of such 
violation." 
U.C.A. Section 56-l-14. 
In Haun vs Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 62 P. 908, 909, 
22 Utah 346, 347 (1900) the engineer and fireman on the train 
testified, on behalf of the defendant, that the whistle was blown 
and the bell rung. At least 10 other witnesses, several of whom 
were passengers on the train, testified, on behalf of defendant, 
that they heard the whistle, but were not asked, and did not testify, 
whether or not the bell was rung. On behalf of the plaintiff, 
several witnesses who were in view of the place of the accident, 
and in a position where they could easily see and hear what trans-
Pired, testified that they neither saw nor heard the whistle or 
~e bell, that their hearing was good, and that their attention was 
~ected to the approaching train, and to whether the whistle was 
~n and the bell rung. 
In Haun the Court concluded that in an action against a 
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railroad company for damages for personal injuries, the questicr. 
of defendant's negligence in failing to sound the 
the bell as required by statute was solely within 
Whistle and r'-: 
r 
the Province ', 
the jury, as well as questions concerning the credib1"1 1·ty f 0. ne 
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. 
I Evidence is "positive" in character where witness states 1 
that a certain thing did, or did not, happen or exist, and "nega. 
tive" in character where witness states that he did not see or i_ 
know of happening or existence of a circumstance or fact. 33 
Words and Phrases, Page 72. 
The Haun case states that affirmative testimony, unless 
of greater weight than negative testimony cannot be of higher 
character. The Court in Haun states two exceptions to the rule 
that positive testimony is of a higher character and to be giver. 
greater weight than negative testimony, both of which are s~i~ 
in the instant case. The exceptions arise: 
"(1) When negative witnesses who are credible, and 
who were in a position where they could readily hear 
and see •...rhat transpired, and directed their attention 
thereto, testify that they did not see or hear the occu> 
renee testified to by the affirmative witnesses; and , 
(2) when negative witnesses, who are credible, and were, 
in a position where they could readily see and hear~~ 1 
transpired, and directed their attention thereto, 
testify positively that the occurrences testified to by 
the affirmative witnesses did not happen." (P 347) 
The testimony presented at trial disclosed that both f·!rs,! 
Nelson and Mrs. Wagstaff were in a position from which theY cou:;; 
I 
readily hear and see what transpired. They were in the process 
passing over the railroad tracks in some haste since theY were 
aware of the close approach of the train. Their attention dS 
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directed to the train from the moment they first observed it vis-
uallY since it presented an obvious risk of harm to them. Their 
testimony is in direct conflict with that of the engineer since 
they both testified the whistle was not sounded until the train 
ws "very close" to the crossing, whereas the engineer said he 
sounded the whistle beginning at the statutory one-quarter mile. 
futh are credible witnesses since they have no interest in the out-
come of the case. 
The reason for the exceptions created in Haun is that if 
there were no exceptions to the rule in question, affirmative 
testimony in no instance could be overcome by negative testimony, 
however strong and convincing the negative testimony might be. It 
may be true in fact that under some circumstances greater weight 
should be given to the positive statement of one witness than to 
the negative statement of another; but it depends upon the circum-
stances, and is not true, as an abstract proposition of law. 
The Court in Haun draws a distinction between two types 
of negative testimony. The weaker is where a witness merely does 
not remember the whistle. Such testimony is not sufficient to 
controvert a positive statement that the whistle did sound as re-
quired, other things being equal. 
The stronger variety occurs where the witness testifies 
that an event did not occur. 
"Evidence of a negative nature may under particular 
circumstances, not only be equal, but superior, to positive 
evidence. This must always depend upon the question whether 
the negative testimony can be attributed to inattention, 
error, or defect of memory, and whether the witnesses had 
equal means and opportunities for ascertaining the facts 
to which they testify and exercised the same. * * * It 
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has been often held that it is not true, as a matt 
law, that negative evidence may not be sufficient~ 
overbalance positive testimony. In such cases the~ ., 
or judge have to weigh, consider, and decide for t~ 
somewhat regardless of general rules. 11 -----"-
State vs. Kansas City Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 70 Mo. App, 
641, 642, Haun vs Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 62 P. 908, 911, 
22 Utah 346, 348 (1900). 
Obviously the testimony of the two women in the car and 
the auto mechanic was of the type which should be accorded pr~~ 
tive value. Those witnesses were all paying attention and t~· 
women remember explicitly seeing or hearing the train without 
hearing the whistle, until the train was three telephone poles: 
five seconds prior to the collision, or less than 300 feet. 
All three of those witnesses are saying the whistle was 
not sounded between the beginning of the quarter mile stat~ory 
distance and the last 300 feet. The testimony of each of the f:. 
witnesses for plaintiff corroborates that of the other on th~ 
question. Such corroboration by the witnesses adds strength an; 
credibility to their general testimony. Forbes vs Forbes 29 
S.E.2d 829, 831, 18 EVa 636, 639 (1944). 
Defendant supported its motion for nonsuit by citing 
Anderson vs Union Pacific Railroad Company 289 P. 146, 76 m~ 
324 (1930). In that case the engineer testified he sounded t~ 
whistle and rang the bell. Unlike the instant case, the engi-
neer's testimony was controverted only by witnesses who were& 
gaged in other endeavors and not attentive to the circumstance: 
or existence of a train. Their testimony constituted onlY n~~ 
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evidence with no probative value, since they merely could not 
remember hearing a bell or whistle. That case can obviously be 
' distinguished from the instant case where concerned and attentive 
'.-Jitnesses failed to hear. 
The Anderson case is further distinguishable from the 
case at hand. In this case Michael Peterson was out washing his 
auto when he heard the noise of the train, but does not recall 
h"ing his attention drawn to any whistle while the train was still 
approaching his house, which is closest to the railroad tracks. 
This testimony is consistent with that of Mrs. Nelson and Mrs. 
~gstaff, since the train was at a greater distance at the time 
of Mr. Peterson's observation than when the two ladies testified 
they first heard the whistle. His testimony is also consistent 
with that of the mechanic, Mr. Karras. This consistency in it-
self differentiates the instant case from Anderson. In Anderson 
one of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that he could remember 
no bell or whistle being sounded at all, while the other alleges 
that the whistle was blown but the bell not sounded. 
Defendant also relies upon Jensen vs Ogden Short Line R. 
~' 204 P. 101, 59 Utah 367 (1922). In Jensen numerous witnesses 
testified on behalf of defendant that the whistle was blown and 
the bell rung when the train approached the crossing. This was 
refuted by only one witness for the plaintiff, who was with the 
~ceased and admitted his attention was centered on a train on 
another track going the other direction. His testimony that he 
tid not hear a bell or whistle from the train which struck the 
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vehicle of the deceased was determined to be not sufficient tc 
support a verdict that the whistle and bell were not sounded. 
The present case also is distinguishable on the basis~ 
the number of witnesses testifying and their lack of intere~. 
the outcome. These factors should be taken into consideratior. 
since they are circumstances which the Haun Court states shooh 
considered in weighing the testimony. 
In Jensen there were numerous witnesses asserting ~~ 
tively that the bell and whistle were activated, whereas he~~ 
the engineer in a self-serving manner makes such an assertioo. 
Four disinterested parties agree that there was no whistle sou~ 
until the train was within less than 300 feet of the crossing, 
at which point the whistle was heard by three of them for t~ 
first time. The engineer's interest in the outcome and in his 
own actions should be considered in weighing his testimony. 
It is appeTI.ant 's contention that the trial court failec 
to consider the credibility of the witnesses in the present cas, 
"Credibility of testimony, which is its capacity for being bcl~ 
must be settled before weighing it, since there is no occasion: 
weighing if it has not this quality." Weliska's Case, 131 A.:· 
125 Me. 147 (1926). Any question as to the exercise of due ~f 
must be determined by the jury by considering the personalities 
of the witnesses, their apparent interest in the controversy ar: 
their qualifications to give evidence, all of which matters are 
properly cognizable under the term credibility. If ;;; appropri: 
credibility factor were allocated to the respective testimo~( 
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~~e four consistent ;.;itnesses, it is evident ,that reasonable minds 
.wuld at the very least, differ, and could have given as much if 
oot more credence to the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses than 
that of the engineer. 
In Clark vs Union Pacific Ry. Co., 257 P. 1050, 1053, 
70 ~ah 29 (1927), at the time of the crossing accident it was very 
foggy and two school girls particularly listened for the whistle 
of the train in order to learn just how late they were for school. 
~o men were driving a team towards the crossing and were contin-
uously alert for the sound of the train because they were not able 
to see in the fog. The Court concluded that testimony concerning 
~ot hearing the whistle, though "negative" in character, was of 
probative value and created a jury question as to the failure to 
give warning. The Court stated: 
"It is clear that where one witness testifies that 
the bell was rung and the whistle blown, and another witness 
of equal opportunity to know the fact testifies that he 
was listening to see whether the whistle did or did not 
sound and the bell ring, and that the whistle did not 
sound nor the bell ring, positive testimony is met by 
positive testimony, and if the witnesses are of equal 
credibility, the testimony of the one is entitled as 
much weight as the other." (P 1053) 
The Utah Court in Hudson vs Union Pacific R.R. Co., 233 
P. 26 357, 120 Utah 245 (1951) agreed with the Clark decision. 
The~ opinion notes that the rule required before a jury 
question is created where there is conflicting testimony concern-
ing whether warning signals were given is that, 
''It must be made to appear that they were (l) paying 
some attention to what actually occurred and (2) that 
they were in a position where they could and did observe 
what was done or what was not done." 
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Mrs. Nelson and Mrs. Wagstaff both knew they were appr: 
ing a railroad crossing, saw the train, and discussed crossi~ 
the tracks in view of the fact that the train was "very close." 
Only wh~n t.~;~! .s~r began to go up on the tracks and cross the: 
.... 
did they hear any whistle sounded. Their proximity to the inte: 
section and their discussion of the matter indicate they were 
attentive to what was actually occurring, and the fact that t~ 
saw the train prior to crossing the tracks and only heard t~ 
whistle while upon them indicates that they were in a position. 
observe what was being done. Further, the fact that the mechan' 
and Michael Peterson both heard the train before the whistle, 
and then subsequently heard the whistle only a few seconds prior 
to the collision, demonstrates their attentiveness to what was 
happening. The sound of the train without a whistle most li~~ 
was the thing that drew their attention. Both were in a positi:· 
to observe what was being done with respect to sounding of a 
whistle, since both could hear the train but not the whistle. 
Observation, as the term is used by the Court in Hudson, refers 
to hearing and not necessarily seeing, since the test was deriv: 
from Clark, where the witnesses could not see any train because 
the fog but could hear the sound of a whistle had one been sound• 
It is obvious that if one could hear the train approaching as tr'' 
mechanic and Michael Peterson testify they did, then one or botr. 
would necessarily have heard the whistle, had it been sounded. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that the trUl 
. t and that 
court erred in granting defendant's motion for nonsul ' 
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the trial court's judgment should accordingly be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
211 East 300 South, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
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